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Abstract
We provide a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme which has statistically-
hiding and computationally-binding properties from any quantum one-way function. Our
protocol is basically a parallel composition of the previous non-interactive quantum bit
commitment schemes (based on quantum one-way permutations, due to Dumais, Mayers
and Salvail (EUROCRYPT 2000)) with pairwise independent hash functions. To con-
struct our non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme from any quantum one-way
function, we follow the procedure below: (i) from Dumais-Mayers-Salvail scheme to a
weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment (of a parallel variant); (ii) from the
weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment to a strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2
binding commitment; (iii) from the strongly-hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding commitment
to a normal statistically-hiding commitment. In the classical case, statistically-hiding bit
commitment scheme (by Haitner, Nguyen, Ong, Reingold and Vadhan (SIAM J. Com-
put., Vol.39, 2009)) is also constructible from any one-way function. While the classical
statistically-hiding bit commitment has large round complexity, our quantum scheme is
non-interactive, which is advantageous over the classical schemes. A main technical con-
tribution is to provide a quantum analogue of the new interactive hashing theorem, due
to Haitner and Reingold (CCC 2007). Moreover, the parallel composition enables us to
simplify the security analysis drastically.
Keyword: quantum bit commitment, quantum one-way function, non-interactive
1 Introduction
A bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic protocol between two parties. The protocol
consists of two phases: commit phase and reveal phase. In the commit phase, the sender, say
Alice, has a bit b in her private space and she wants to commit b to the receiver, say Bob.
They exchange messages and at the end of the commit phase Bob gets some information that
represents b. In the reveal phase, Alice confides b to Bob by exchanging messages. At the
end of the reveal phase, Bob judges whether the information gotten in the reveal phase really
represents b or not. Basically, there are three requirements for secure bit commitment: the
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correctness, the hiding property and the binding property. The correctness guarantees that
if both parties are honest then, for any bit b ∈ {0, 1} Alice has, Bob accepts with certainty.
The hiding property guarantees that (cheating) Bob cannot reveal the committed bit during
the commit phase. The binding property guarantees that (cheating) Alice cannot commit
her bit b such that Alice maliciously reveal b⊕ 1 as her committed bit but Bob accepts.
In the classical case, a simple argument shows the impossibility of bit commitment with
the hiding and the binding properties both statistical. Thus, either hiding or binding must be
computational. A construction of statistically-binding scheme from any pseudorandom gen-
erator was given by Naor [23]. Since the existence of one-way functions is equivalent to that of
pseudorandom generators [18], the statistically-binding scheme can be based on any one-way
function. A construction of statistically-hiding scheme (NOVY scheme) from one-way permu-
tation was given by Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [24]. After that, the assumption
of the existence of one-way permutation was relaxed to that of approximable-preimage-size
one-way function [12]. Finally, Haitner and Reingold [15] showed that a statistically-hiding
scheme (HNORV scheme [13]) can be based on any one-way function.
Since statistically-binding (resp., statistically-hiding) bit commitment schemes are used
as building block for zero-knowledge proof (resp., zero-knowledge argument) systems [10, 3],
it is desirable to be efficient from several viewpoints (e.g., the total size of messages exchanged
during the protocol, or the round number of communications in the protocol). In general,
the round complexity of statistically-hiding schemes is large (see, e.g., [14, 11]).
Let us move on the quantum case. After the unconditionally security of the BB84 quantum
key distribution protocol [2] was shown, the possibility of unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitments had been investigated. Unfortunately, the impossibility of unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment was shown [21, 22]. After that, some relaxations such as
quantum string commitment [19] or cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment [1, 17, 4] have
been studied.
In this paper, we take the computational approach as in the classical case. Along this
line, Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [8] showed a construction of perfectly-hiding quantum bit
commitment scheme (DMS scheme) based on quantum one-way permutation. The non-
interactivity in DMS scheme is advantageous over the classical statistically-hiding bit com-
mitments. Unfortunately, we have not found any candidate of quantum one-way permuta-
tion, because known candidates for classical one-way permutation are no longer one-way in
the quantum setting due to Shor’s algorithm [26]. Koshiba and Odaira [20] observed that the
binding property of DMS scheme holds for any quantum one-way functions and showed that
any approximable-preimage-size quantum one-way function suffices for the statistical hiding
property.
In this paper, we further generalize statistically-hiding quantum bit commitment schemes
in [8, 20] and show that a statistically-hiding quantum bit commitment is constructible from
any general quantum one-way function without losing the non-interactivity. We basically
follow the steps of the proof in [13]. Thus, we remark the similarity and differences.
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• As in HNORV scheme [13], we consider to construct a 1-out-of-2 binding commitment
scheme based on any quantum one-way function as an intermediate scheme. Our 1-out-
of-2 binding commitment scheme executes in parallel two commitment schemes where
one of the two commitment schemes satisfies the binding property and the other does
not have to satisfy the binding property. Note that any adversary for the classical 1-out-
of-2 binding commitment (of the serial composition) cannot see the second commitment
just after getting the first commitment. But, in our case, the adversary can get both
the first and the second commitments, which may be correlated. Thus, we have to cope
with the adversary that can have more information. One of important technical tools
in [13] is so-called “new interactive hashing theorem” [14]. We provides a quantum
analogue of the new interactive hashing theorem.
• Since the resulting 1-out-of-2 binding commitment scheme satisfies the hiding property
only in a weak sense, some hiding amplification technique is applied to yield a 1-out-of-2
binding commitment scheme with the hiding property in a strong sense. To this end,
we just consider the repetitional use of quantum one-way function and show that the
simple repetition works for the hiding amplification. In [13], an amplification procedure
is recursively iterated and an iterative analysis is made. Due to the parallel composition,
we can drastically simplify the security analysis of the hiding amplification.
• Finally, we construct a (normal) statistically-hiding quantum bit commitment from the
1-out-of-2 binding commitment scheme. Unlike HNORV scheme, we do not use, in this
step, the technique of universal one-way hash functions, which requires interactions.
Remark. In the quantum setting, there are several definitions for the binding property of
commitment schemes. In [7], a satisfactory definition is given. Nonetheless, we adopt a
weaker definition as in [8] and construct a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme
based on the weak definition. It seems much more difficult to prove the security of our
construction according to the definition in [7] by using our techniques. I believe that the weak
definition is sufficient for some applications. Actually, a construction of quantum oblivious
transfer from a quantum string commitment (of a special type) with a similar weak binding
condition was given in [6].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and Conventions
We denote the m-dimensional Hilbert space by Hm. Let {|0〉, |1〉} denote the computational
basis for H2. When the context requires, we write |b〉+ to denote |b〉 in the computational
basis. Let {|0〉×, |1〉×} denote the diagonal basis, where |0〉× = 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉) and |1〉× =
1√
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(|0〉 − |1〉). For any x = x1x2 · · · xn ∈ {0, 1}n and θ ∈ {+,×}, |x〉θ denotes the state
⊗ni=1|xi〉θ. We denote |0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |0〉 by |0〉. For projections, we denote P0+ = |0〉〈0|, P1+ =
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|1〉〈1|, P0× = |0〉×〈0|, and P1× = |1〉×〈1|. For any x ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote Px+ = ⊗ni=1Pxi+ and
Px× = ⊗ni=1Pxi× . For the sake of simplicity, we also write Px instead of Px+. We define θ(0) = +
and θ(1) = ×. Thus, for any w ∈ {0, 1}, {Pxθ(w)}x∈{0,1}n is the von Neumann measurement.
For density matrices σ and ρ, we define δ(σ, ρ)
def
= ‖σ − ρ‖1, where ‖A‖1 = 12tr
√
A†A. For
two classical random variables X and Y , there exists the corresponding density matrices ρX
and ρY . Since δ(ρX , ρY ) also represents the variation distance (a.k.a. statistical distance)
between X and Y , we sometimes write δ(X,Y ) instead of δ(ρX , ρY ). We denote the min-
entropy of a random variable X by H∞(X) and the Renyi entropy (of order 2) by H2(X).
We denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n by Un. For a set A, we sometimes use the
same symbol to denote the uniform distribution over the set A. A function ν : N → R is
negligible if for every polynomial p there exists n0 ∈ N such for all n ≥ n0, ν(n) < 1/p(n).
We denote a set of integers {i ∈ N : n1 ≤ i ≤ n2} by [n1, n2].
2.2 Quantum One-Way Functions
In order to give definitions of quantum one-way functions, we have to decide a model of
quantum computation. In this paper, we consider (uniform or non-uniform) quantum cir-
cuit family. As a universal quantum gate set, we take the controlled-NOT, the one-qubit
Hadamard gate, and arbitrary one-qubit non-trivial rotation gate. The computational com-
plexity of a circuit C is measured by the number of elementary gates (in the universal gate
set) contained in C and denoted by size(C). For any circuit family C = {Cn}n∈N, if size(Cn)
is bounded by p(n) for some polynomial p, C is called p-size circuit family.
Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ(n)}n∈N be a function family. To compute f , we need
a circuit family {Cn}n∈N where Cn is a circuit on m(n) ≥ ℓ(n) qubits. To compute fn(x)
for x ∈ {0, 1}n, we apply Cn to |x〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗m(n)−n. The output of Cn is obtained by the von
Neumann measurement in the computational basis on ℓ(n) qubits.
Definition 2.1 A function family f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ(n)}n∈N is s(n)-secure quantum
one-way if
• there exists a p-size circuit family C = {Cn}n∈N such that, for all n ≥ 1 and all x ∈
{0, 1}n, Cn(|x〉 ⊗ |0〉) = fn(x) with certainty;
• for every p-size circuit family B = {Bn}n∈N and for sufficiently large n,
Pr[fn(Bn(fn(Un))) = fn(Un)] < 1/s(n).
If f is p(n)-secure quantum one-way for every polynomial p, then f is said to be p-secure.
Quantum one-way function f is said to be r(n)-regular if for any y ∈ supp(f(Un)),
|{x ∈ {0, 1}n : fn(x) = y}| = 2r(n). Without loss of generality, we can consider quantum
one-way functions that are length-preserving, that is, ℓ(n) = n, because general quantum
one-way functions can be converted into ones that are length-preserving.
4
2.3 Quantum Bit Commitment
In a non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme, honest Alice with her bit w ∈ {0, 1}
starts with a system Hall = Hkeep⊗Hopen⊗Hcommit in the initial state |0〉, executes a quantum
circuit Cn,w on |0〉 returning the final state |ψw〉 ∈ Hall and finally sends the subsystem Hcommit
to Bob in the reduced state ρB(w) = trA(|ψw〉〈ψw|), where Alice’s Hilbert space is HA =
Hkeep ⊗ Hopen. For w ∈ {0, 1}, we call ρB(w) w-commitment state. Once the system Hcommit
(or, w-commitment state) is sent to Bob, Alice has only access to ρA(w) = trB(|ψw〉〈ψw|),
where Bob’s Hilbert space is HB = Hcommit. To reveal the commitment, Alice needs only to
send the system Hopen together with w. Bob then checks the value of w by measuring the
system Hopen ⊗ Hcommit with some measurement that is fixed by the protocol in view of w.
Bob obtains w = 0, w = 1, or w = ⊥ when the value of w is rejected.
Cheating Alice must start with the state |0〉 of some system Hall = Hextra⊗HA⊗Hcommit.
A quantum circuit Dn that acts on Hall is executed to obtain a state |ψ〉 and the subsystem
Hcommit is sent to Bob. Later, any quantum circuit On which acts on Hextra ⊗ Hkeep ⊗ Hopen
can be executed before sending the subsystem Hopen to Bob. The important quantum circuits
which act on Hextra⊗Hkeep⊗Hopen are the quantum circuitsOn,0 (resp., On,1) which maximizes
the probability that bit w = 0 (resp., w = 1) is revealed with success. Therefore, any attack
can be modeled by triplets of quantum circuits {(Dn,On,0,On,1)}n∈N.
Let b0(n) (resp., b1(n)) be the probability that she succeeds to reveal 0 (resp., 1) using the
corresponding optimal circuit On,0 (resp., On,1). The definition of bw(n) explicitly requires
that the value of w, which cheating Alice tries to open, is chosen not only before the execution
of the measurement on Hopen ⊗ Hcommit by Bob but also before the execution of the circuit
On,w by cheating Alice.
In the quantum setting, it is pointed out in [22] that the requirement “b0(n) = 0 ∨
b1(n) = 0” for the binding condition is too strong. Thus, we adopt a weaker condition
b(n)
def
= b0(n) + b1(n)− 1 ≤ ε where ε(n) is negligible, which is the same condition as in [8].
Since we consider the computational binding, we modify the above discussion so as to
fit the computational setting. Instead of the triplet (Dn,On,0,On,1), we consider a pair
(Dn,0,Un). If we set Dn,0 = (On,0⊗Icommit) ·Dn, and Un = On,1 ·O†n,0, we can easily see that
the adversary’s strategy does not change. Note that Dn,0 acts in Hall and Un is restricted to
act only in Hextra ⊗ Hkeep ⊗ Hopen.
Definition 2.2 A non-interactive quantum bit commitment is t(n)-computationally-binding
if, for every a family {(Dn,0,Un)}n∈N of p-size circuit pairs, b(n) is bounded by t(n). If
t(n) is negligible in n, the non-interactive quantum bit commitment is simply said to be
computationally-binding.
Definition 2.3 A non-interactive quantum bit commitment is t(n)-statistically-binding if
b(n) ≤ t(n). If t(n) is negligible in n, the non-interactive quantum bit commitment is simply
said to be statistically-hiding.
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As mentioned, a satisfactory definition for the binding property of quantum bit commit-
ment schemes is given by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Renner, Salvail and Schaffner [7]. Actually, they
show that a variant of DMS scheme satisfies the binding condition in [7]. However, it is still
unclear whether the inverting quantum one-way permutation is reducible to violating the
binding condition. We rather adopt a weaker definition in [8] in order to benefit from the
computational reducibility.
2.4 Pairwise Independent Hash Functions
Let H = {Hn}n∈N be a sequence of function families, where each Hn is a family of functions
mapping binary strings of length ℓ(n) to strings of length v(n). We say that Hn is a pairwise
independent (a.k.a. strongly 2-universal) hash family if for any distinct x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(n)
and y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}v(n) , Prh←Hn [h(x) = y ∧ h(x′) = y′] = 2−2v(n). (See, e.g., [5] for an
implementation of pairwise independent hash family.)
One of the useful applications of pairwise independent hash family is smoothing the min-
entropy of given distribution.
Lemma 2.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma) Let Vn be a random variable over {0, 1}ℓ(n) such that
H∞(Vn) ≥ λn and Hn be a pairwise independent hash family where each h ∈ Hn maps strings
of length ℓ(n) to strings of length λn−2 log(ε−1). Then, we have δ((Hn,Hn(Vn)), (Hn, Uv(n))) ≤
ε.
3 Base Scheme
Dumais, Mayers and Salvail [8] gave a non-interactive statistically-hiding quantum bit com-
mitment based on quantum one-way permutation. Koshiba and Odaira [20] observed that
DMS scheme still satisfies the computational binding if we replace quantum one-way per-
mutation with general quantum one-way function. So, we consider to use the scheme as an
important ingredient of the construction of our non-interactive statistically-hiding quantum
bit commitment based on quantum one-way function.
We briefly review the scheme. Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be a function family.
The quantum bit commitment scheme takes the security parameter n and the description of
function family f as common inputs. For given f and the security parameter n, Alice and
Bob determine fn. The protocol, called Base Protocol, is described in Figure 1.
Proposition 3.1 (Implicit in [8] and explicit in [20]) Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be
a family of (not necessarily quantum one-way) functions such that δ(f(Un), U
′
n) is negligible
in n. Then, Base Protocol is statistically hiding.
Proposition 3.2 (Implicit in [8] and explicit in [20]) Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N
be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way function family. Then Base Protocol is O(1/
√
s(n))-
computationally binding.
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Commit Phase:
1. Alice with her bit w first chooses x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly and computes y = fn(x).
2. Next, Alice sends the quantum state |fn(x)〉θ(w) ∈ Hcommit to Bob.
3. Bob then stores the received quantum state until Reveal Phase.
Reveal Phase:
1. Alice first announces w and x to Bob.
2. Next, Bob measures ρB with measurement {P yθ(w)}y∈range(fn) and obtains the classical
output y′ ∈ range(fn).
3. Lastly, Bob accepts if and only if y′ = fn(x).
Figure 1: Base Protocol
In this paper, we do not use directly the above properties. We need to generalize Propo-
sition 3.2. In non-interactive commitment protocols, Alice sends a commitment y in Commit
Phase and a decommitment x in Reveal Phase. To make Bob accept, the pair (y, x) must
be in some binary relation Rn. In case of Base Protocol, the binary relation is defined as
Rn = {(fn(x), x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n}. We can rephrase the statement of Proposition 3.2 in terms
of the binary relation Rn. It says that if cheating Alice can output distinct pairs (y, x) and
(y′, x′) both in Rn such that the probability to reveal 0 with success by using (x, y) is b0(n),
the probability to reveal 1 with success by using (x′, y′) is b1(n), and b0(n)+b1(n) ≥ 1+
√
s(n),
then there exists an algorithm that, given fn(x) as input, outputs x such that (fn(x), x) ∈ Rn
with probability Ω(s(n)). Since Base Protocol is based on quantum one-way function, the
definition of Rn is quite natural. On the other hand, we may define a binary relation as
R′n = {(fn(x), x) : x ∈Wn} by using some subset Wn ⊆ {0, 1}n. We discuss a generalization
of Proposition 3.2 in the next section.
4 Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem
The following theorem is a quantum correspondence1 of the new interactive hashing theorem
in [14] and it is one of the most technical ingredients in this paper.
Theorem 4.1 (Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem) Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N
be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way function family. Suppose that Wn is a subset of {0, 1}n
and define the binary relation R′n as R′n = {(fn(x), x) : x ∈Wn}. If there exists an algorithm
1Exactly speaking, Theorem 4.1 corresponds to a special case of the new interactive hashing theorem in [14]
and the current form suffices for our purpose. As in [14], we can derive a more general form of Non-interactive
Quantum Hashing Theorem.
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against Base Protocol that can output distinct pairs (y, x) and (y′, x′) both in R′n such that
the probability to reveal 0 with success by using (x, y) is b0(n), the probability to reveal 1 with
success by using (x′, y′) is b1(n), and b0(n)+ b1(n) ≥ 1+
√
s(n), then there exists another al-
gorithm that, given y′′ ∈ fn(Wn) as input, outputs x′′ such that (y′′, x′′) ∈ R′n with probability
Ω(s(n)), where y′′ is propotionally selected from fn(Wn).
IfWn is closed to Un in the statement above, Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem
can be directly applied to construct an inverter of the quantum one-way function as in [8, 20].
However, if Wn is far from Un, it is not directly related to the inversion of the quantum one-
way function. In the next section, we discuss how to use it even in the case where Wn is far
from Un.
For the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can adapt the proof of Proposition 3.2. In the original
proof in [8] of Proposition 3.2, some “test circuits” are utilized. The existence of test circuits
is an obstacle to the generalization. A careful analysis shows that such test circuits are
redundant.
Proof. We separate the whole system into three parts: the system Hcommit that encodes
the functional value, the system Hopen that encodes inputs to the function, and the system
Hkeep is the reminder of the system.
Perfect Case:
In the perfect case, we can assume that an adversary {Dn,0,Un}n∈N reveals the committed
bit in both ways perfectly. That is, the states |ψn,0〉 (resp., |ψn,1〉) of the whole system when
w = 0 (resp., w = 1) will be committed can be written as follows.
|ψn,0〉 =
∑
x∈Wn
|α0,x〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit+ = Dn,0|0〉 and
|ψn,1〉 =
∑
x∈Wn
|α1,x〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit× = Un|ψn,0〉,
where
∑
x∈Wn ‖ |α0,x〉‖2 =
∑
x∈Wn ‖ |α1,x〉‖2 = 1.
Let Pu,commit+ and Pu,commit× be the projection operators Pu+ and Pu× respectively, acting
in Hcommit. We are interested in properties on the state |ϕun,0〉 = Pu,commit× |ψn,0〉 which plays
an important role for the inverter.
Now we consider an algorithm to invert y ∈ fn(Wn). Thus, we assume that y is encoded
as input to the inverter in Hinv. Before considering the inverter, we consider properties on
the states |ϕun,0〉 for every u ∈ {0, 1}n:
1. ‖|ϕun,0〉‖2 = 2−n/2;
2. there exists an efficient circuit Wn on Hinv ⊗ Hopen ⊗ Hcommit which if u is in Hinv,
unitarily maps |ψn,0〉 to 2n/2|ϕun,0〉;
3. Un|ϕun,0〉 =
∑
z∈f−1n (u) |α1,z〉keep ⊗ |z〉open ⊗ |u〉commit× .
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If the above properties are true, we can consider an inverter as follows. On input y, the
inverter generates the state |ψn,0〉 by applying Dn,0 to |0〉, then applies Wn and Un in order,
and finally measures Hopen to obtain z ∈ f−1n (y).
In what follows, we show each property is true. First, we show Property 1. We write
|ψn,0〉 using the diagonal basis for Hcommit, and then we have
|ψn,0〉 =
∑
x∈Wn
|α0,x〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗

 ∑
u∈{0,1}n
(−1)〈u,fn(x)〉
2n/2
|u〉commit×


= 2−n/2
∑
u ∈ {0, 1}n
x∈Wn
(−1)〈u,fn(x)〉|α0,x〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |u〉commit× .
Since
|ϕun,0〉 = 2−n/2
∑
x∈Wn
(−1)〈u,fn(x)〉|α0,x〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |u〉commit× ,
Property 1 holds. Next, we consider Property 3. Since the state |ψn,1〉 can be written as
|ψn,1〉 =
∑
u∈fn(Wn)

 ∑
z∈f−1n (u)
|α1,z〉keep ⊗ |z〉open

⊗ |u〉commit× ,
it implies that for every u ∈ fn(Wn)
Un|ϕun,0〉 = UnPu,commit× |ψn,0〉 = Pu,commit× Un|ψn,0〉
= Pu,commit× |ψn,1〉 =
∑
z∈f−1n (u)
|α1,z〉keep ⊗ |z〉open ⊗ |u〉commit× .
(Note that Un is restricted to act in Hkeep⊗Hopen and thus Un and Pu,commit× are commutable.)
Thus, Property 3 holds. Finally, we consider Property 2. We describe how to implement Wn
mapping from
|u〉inv ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit+
into
(−1)〈u,fn(x)〉|u〉inv ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |u〉commit×
for every u ∈ fn(Wn), which satisfies the requirement. First we apply the mapping |u〉inv ⊗
|fn(x)〉commit 7→ (−1)〈u,fn(x)〉|u〉inv ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit, which can be efficiently implemented by
using the Hadamard gate and the controlled-NOT gate. Secondly, we apply the mapping
|x〉open ⊗ |u〉commit 7→ |x〉open ⊗ |u ⊕ fn(x)〉commit, which can be implemented by the efficient
evaluation circuit of fn. Thirdly, we apply the mapping |y〉inv ⊗ |u〉commit 7→ |y〉inv ⊗ |y ⊕
u〉commit, which can be efficiently implemented by using the controlled-NOT gate. Finally,
we apply the Hadamard gate to the all qubits in Hcommit. It is easy to verify that the above
procedure satisfies the requirement. Thus, Property 2 holds.
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General Case:
In the general case, the states |ψ˜n,0〉 = Dn,0|0〉 and |ψ˜n,1〉 = Un|ψ˜n,0〉 can be generally written
as
|ψ˜n,0〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n,y∈{0,1}n
|α0,x,y〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |y〉commit+ , and
|ψ˜n,1〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n,y∈{0,1}n
|α1,x,y〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |y〉commit× ,
where
∑
x,y ‖ |α0,x,y〉‖2 =
∑
x,y ‖ |α1,x,y〉‖2 = 1.
We assume that b0(n) + b1(n) ≥ 1 + 1/p(n) for some polynomial p, where
b0(n) =
∑
x∈Wn
‖ |α0,x,fn(x)〉‖2 and b1(n) =
∑
x∈Wn
‖ |α1,x,fn(x)〉‖2.
Then we will show that the success probability pinv for inverting the underlying quantum
one-way function is greater than 1/4(p(n))2.
First, the state |ψ˜n,0〉 can be written as follows.
|ψ˜n,0〉 =
∑
x∈Wn
|α0,x,fn(x)〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit
+
∑
fn(x)6=z or x 6∈Wn
|α0,x,z〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |z〉commit.
Remember that the state in the perfect case can be written as
|ψn,0〉 =
∑
x∈Wn
|αx,0〉keep ⊗ |x〉open ⊗ |fn(x)〉commit.
Then we have
|α0,x〉keep = (b0(n))−1/2|α0,x,fn(x)〉keep and b0(n) =
∑
x∈Wn
‖ |α0,x,fn(x)〉‖2 = |〈ψn,0|ψ˜n,0〉|2.
On input y, the inverter generates the state |ψ˜n,0〉 by applying Dn,0 to |0〉. We then apply
in order Wn and Un to the resulting state and finally measures Hopen to hopefully obtain
z ∈ f−1n (y).
We have to estimate the success probability of the inverter. To this end, we define two
projections:
P0 def=
∑
x∈Wn
Px,open ⊗ Pfn(x),commit+ and
P1 def=
∑
x∈Wn
Px,open ⊗ Pfn(x),commit× .
Then we have b0(n) = ‖P0|ψ˜n,0〉‖2 and b1(n) = ‖P1|ψ˜n,1〉‖2. Here, we claim that the success
probability pinv satisfies
pinv = ‖P1UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉‖2.
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We will see this claim. As mentioned, the state is |y〉inv⊗|ψn,0〉 with probability ‖P0|ψ˜n,0〉‖2 =
b0(n), where y is the input to the inverter. As we see in the perfect case, Wn maps the state
|ψn,0〉 into 2n/2|ϕyn,0〉 = 2n/2Py,commit× |ψn,0〉. After that, we apply Un and measure Hopen.
Thus, the success probability pinv(y) for input y is written as
pinv(y) = b0(n)2
n
∥∥∥∥∥∥

 ∑
z∈f−1n (y)
Pz,open

Py,commit× Un|ψn,0〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 2n
∥∥∥∥∥∥

 ∑
z∈f−1n (y)
Pz,open

Py,commit× UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
Averaging over all value according to the output distribution of fn, we have
pinv =
∑
y∈fn(Wn)
Pr[y = fn(Un)]pinv(y)
=
∑
y∈fn(Wn)
∥∥∥∥∥∥



 ∑
z∈f−1n (y)
Pz,open

⊗ Py,commit×

UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥

 ∑
y∈fn(Wn)



 ∑
z∈f−1n (y)
Pz,open

⊗ Py,commit×



UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= ‖P1UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉‖2.
Furthermore, we rewrite the above to easily estimate the value of pinv.
pinv = ‖P1UnP0|ψ˜n,0〉‖2 = ‖P1Un(I − P⊥0 )|ψ˜n,0〉‖2
= ‖P1Un|ψ˜n,0〉 − P1UnP⊥0 |ψ˜n,0〉‖2
= ‖P1|ψ˜n,1〉 − P1UnP⊥0 |ψ˜n,0〉‖2.
Using the triangle inequality and b1(n) > 1− b0(n), we have
pinv ≥
(
‖P1|ψ˜n,1〉‖ − ‖P1UnP⊥0 |ψ˜n,0〉‖
)2
≥
(
‖P1|ψ˜n,1〉‖ − ‖P⊥0 |ψ˜n,0〉‖
)2
=
(√
b1(n)−
√
1− b0(n)
)2
.
Let us recall that we assume that b0(n)+b1(n) > 1+1/p(n) for some polynomial p. After
some calculation, we have
pinv ≥ 2− 1/p − 2
√
1− 1/p ≥ 1/4(p(n))2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
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5 1-out-of-2 binding commitment from quantum one-way func-
tion
A 1-out-of-2 binding (we denote by
(
2
1
)
-binding) commitment scheme consists of two commit-
ment schemes where one of the two commitment schemes satisfies the binding property and
the other does not have to satisfy the binding property. In [13], Haitner et al. introduced
a notion of 1-out-of-2 binding commitment schemes and gave a construction of
(2
1
)
-binding
commitment schemes based on one-way function. We also consider a quantum version of(2
1
)
-binding commitment scheme and construct a
(2
1
)
-binding quantum commitment scheme.
We define a 2-parallel quantum bit commitment scheme Π = (Π1,Π2), which is a parallel
composition of two non-interactive quantum bit commitment schemes Π1 and Π2. At the
beginning of the protocol Π, Alice has two bits w1 and w2. Π consists of two phases, Commit
Phase and Reveal Phase, as the standard bit commitment schemes do. In Commit Phase,
Alice (in Π) invokes Commit Phase of Π1 and sends w1-commitment state (of Π1) to Bob.
Also she invokes Commit Phase of Π2 and sends w2-commitment state (of Π2) to Bob. We
call the joint state of the w1-commitment state (of Π1) and the w2-commitment state (of Π2)
(w1, w2)-commitment state (of Π). In Reveal phase, Alice sends decommitments both of Π1
and Π2. Bob accepts if the both decommitments are valid.
Next, we would like to define “computational 1-out-of-2 binding”. In the classical case,
it is defined in terms of transcripts. In the quantum case, the definition based on transcripts
is not easy to handle with. Fortunately, our protocol below has a classical inner-state which
controls the 1-out-of-2 binding property. Thus, after providing our protocol, we will give
a protocol-specific definition of computational 1-out-of-2 binding. Moreover, we discuss the
hiding property later.
We give our 2-parallel quantum bit commitment protocol (called Protocol 1) in Figure 2.
While a sequential composition is discussed in [13], our protocol runs Base Protocol twice in
parallel.
Definition 5.1 Protocol 1 is computationally 1-out-of-2-binding if there exists a set S ⊆
{0, 1}n such that for every function ε(n) = 1/poly(n), the first half of the 2-parallel quantum
bit commitment is ε(n)-computationally-binding on condition that a randomly chosen x falls
into S and the second half is ε(n)-statistically-binding on condition that x does not fall into
S.
Next, we define the hiding property. Unfortunately, the hiding property of Protocol 1 is
not so strong. This is because the preimage-size of f is not constant over the inputs. Thus,
we consider the following weak definition of the binding property.
Definition 5.2 If, for any γ with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, there exists a subset Γ ⊆ {0, 1}n satisfying the
following two properties, then 2-parallel quantum bit commitment is γ-hiding.
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Parameters: Integers t ∈ [1, n], ∆1 ∈ [0, t] and ∆2 ∈ [0, n − t].
Commit Phase:
1. Alice with her two bits w1 and w2 first chooses x ∈ {0, 1}n uniformly and computes
y = fn(x). She also randomly chooses two hash functions h1 and h2 from families of
pairwise independent hash functions H(1) = {h1 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}t−∆1} and H(2) =
{h2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n−t−∆2}, respectively.
2. Next, Alice sends the quantum state
|h1, h1(y)〉θ(w1) ⊗ |h2, h2(x)〉θ(w2) ∈ Hcommit1 ⊗ Hcommit2
to Bob.
3. Bob then stores the received quantum state ρB until the reveal phase.
Reveal Phase:
1. Alice announces the first decommitment (w1, h1, y) and the second decommitment
(w2, h2, x) to Bob.
2. Next, Bob measures the first register of ρB with measurement {P h,zθ(w1)}h∈H(1),z∈range(h1)
and obtains the classical output (h, z) ∈ H(1) × range(h1). Also he simultaneously
measures the second register with measurement {P h′,z′θ(w2)}h′∈H(2),z′∈range(h2) and obtains
the classical output (h′, z′) ∈ H(2) × range(h2).
3. Lastly, Bob accepts the first commitment if and only if h(y) = z. Also he accepts the
second commitment if and only if h′(z′) = x and y = fn(x).
Figure 2: Protocol 1
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1. |Γ| ≥ γ · 2n.
2. Let w1, w2 ∈ {0, 1}. Let Z1(w1) be a random variable for the first half of the commit-
ment when w1 is the first bit to be committed and Z2(w2) be a random variable for the
second half when w2 is the second bit to be committed, on condition that x is uniformly
chosen from Γ. Namely, the value for (Z1, Z2) takes |h, h(fn(x))〉θ(w1) ⊗ |h′, h′(x)〉θ(w2)
where h is uniformly chosen from H(1), h′ is uniformly chosen from H(2) and x is
uniformly chosen from Γ. Then, (Z1(0), Z2(0)), (Z1(0), Z2(1)), (Z1(1), Z2(0)) and
(Z1(1), Z2(1)) are negligibly close to each other.
Theorem 5.1 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure regular quantum
one-way function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then Protocol 1 with setting of parameters
∆1 = ∆2 =
1
4 log s(n), is a 2-parallel quantum bit commitment scheme that is computationally
1-out-of-2 binding, regardless of the setting of t.
While HNORV scheme is two sequential of commitment schemes, ours is two parallel of
quantum commitment schemes. Thus, we have to take into the account that the second half
of the commitment might increase the power of the adversary. Fortunately, such information
can be included in the adversary’s private space Hkeep and we can use the same reduction
as in Base Protocol. Actually, this observation plays an important role through the paper.
Moreover, there is another difficulty in the analysis. Since the computational property of
(2
1
)
-
binding commitment is conditional (i.e., x ∈ S), we have to consider the reduction between
two algorithms whose input distributions are different. To overcome the difficulty, we use
Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem. While the proof of the computational part is
similar to the proof in [13], the proof of the statistical part is completely different from the
proof in [13] because it involves the analysis of quantum states.
Proof. For every t ∈ [1, n], we define the set of “heavy” strings to be
St = {x ∈ f−1n (y) : Pr[fn(Un) = y] ≥ 2−t−∆3}
for the parameter ∆3 =
1
2s(n).
We will show that if x ∈ St is chosen in the first step of Commit Phase then the first half
is binding and if x 6∈ St then the second half is binding.
First, we show a reduction from inverting fn to violating the binding property of Protocol
1 in the case of x ∈ St. Let f ′n : H(1) × {0, 1}n → H(1) × {0, 1}t−∆1 be a function that
maps (h, x) to (h, h(fn(x))). We define R
′
n = {(f ′n(h, x), (h, x)) : x ∈ St and h ∈ H(1)} and
Wh,η = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : (η, (h, x)) ∈ R′n}.
Let A1 be a quantum algorithm to violate the binding property (with respect to R′n) of
Protocol 1 with probability ε(n). Then, from Theorem 4.1, we have another algorithm A2
that inverts f ′n(h, x). Namely,
Pr[A2(H(1),H(1)(fn(Un))) ∈WH(1),H(1)(fn(Un))] ≥ ε(n)2/4.
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For each h ∈ H(1) and x ∈ {0, 1}n, we consider
ph,x =
Pr[A2(f ′n(h, x)) ∈Wh,h(fn(x))]
|f ′−1n (f ′n(h, x))|
and set
T = {(h, x) : ph,x ≥ ε(n)
2
8
}.
By the counting argument, we have |T | ≥ ε2(n)/8 · 2n|H(1)|. Here, we estimate the following
probability:
Pr[A2(H(1), Ut−∆1) ∈WH(1),Ut−∆1 ]
≥
∑
(h,x)∈T
Pr[A2(h, h(fn(x))) ∈Wh,h(fn(x))] · Pr[H(1) = h ∧ Ut−∆1 = h(fn(x))]
≥ ε4(n)/64.
We consider an algorithm B that on input y = fn(x), picks randomly a hash function
h ∈ H(1), and outputs A2(h, h(y)). We analysis the probability that B inverts fn in the
following.
Pr[B(fn(Un)) ∈ f−1n (fn(Un))]
= Eh←H(1) [Pr[A2(h, h(fn(Un))) ∈ f−1(fn(Un))]]
= Eh←H(1)

 ∑
x∈{0,1}n
Pr[fn(Un) = fn(x) ∧ A2(h, h(f(xn))) = x]


= Eh←H(1)

 ∑
η,x s.t. η=h(fn(x))
Pr[fn(Un) = fn(x)] · Pr[A2(h, η) = x]


≥ Eh←H(1)

 ∑
η,x s.t. x∈Wh,η
Pr[fn(Un) = fn(x)] · Pr[A2(h, η) = x]


≥ 2−t−∆3 ·Eh←H(1)

 ∑
η,x s.t. x∈Wh,η
Pr[A2(h, η) = x]


= 2−t−∆3 · 2t−∆1 · Pr[A2(H(1), Ut−∆1) ∈WH(1),Ut−∆1 ]
≥ 2−(∆1+∆3) · ε(n)
4
64
= s(n)−3/4 · ε(n)
4
64
,
which is greater than 1/s(n) if ε is non-negligible.
Next, we consider the case x 6∈ St. We define Wy = {(h, h(x)) : h ∈ H(2) and x ∈
f−1n (y)} ⊆ {0, 1}q , where q is the length of (h, h(x)). Any (possibly cheating) quantum state
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|ψ〉 for the second commitment can be written as follows:
|ψ〉 =
∑
z∈Wy
αz|z〉+ +
∑
z 6∈Wy
αz|z〉+,
since {|z〉+}z∈{0,1}q is a basis. Then b0(n) =
∑
z∈Wy |αz|2, Since |ψ〉 can be written as
|ψ〉 =
∑
u∈Wy
∑
z∈{0,1}q
αz(−1)〈u,z〉|u〉× +
∑
u 6∈Wy
∑
z∈{0,1}q
αz(−1)〈u,z〉|u〉×,
b1(n) =
∑
u∈Wy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
z∈{0,1}q
αz(−1)〈u,z〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
2q
.
To maximize b0(n)+b1(n), we set a =
∑
z∈Wy |αz |2 = b0(n). On the condition that b0(n) = a,
b1(n) achieves the maximum when |αz| is uniformly distributed. Actually, it is sufficient to
consider the case where
αz =
{√
a/|Wy| if z ∈Wy√
(1− a)/(2q − |Wy|) otherwise.
Then, we have b1(n) = (
√
a|Wy|+
√
(1− a)(2q − |Wy|))2/2q. Let ξ = |Wy|/2q. Thus, we
have
b(n) = 1 + (2a− 1)ξ + 2
√
a(1− a)ξ(1 − ξ).
After some calculation, we have b(n) ≤ 1 +√ξ. Since
ξ ≤ |{x : f
−1
n (y)}|
2n−t−∆2
≤ 2
n−t−∆3
2n−t−∆2
= 2∆2−∆3 =
1
4
√
s(n)
=
1
nω(1)
,
we can say that b(n) ≤ 1 + 1/nω(1). 
Theorem 5.2 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way
function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then, there exists t = t0 ∈ [1, n] such that Protocol 1
satisfies (1/n)-hiding if we set ∆1 = ∆2 =
1
4 log s(n).
First, we suppose that f is a regular quantum one-way function. Then the preimage-
size is always constant. This means that H2(f(Un)) is also constant. If the parameter t is
correctly given (i.e., t = H2(f(Un))), the first and the second commitment states are almost
maximally mixed. Though there is a small amount of correlation between the first and the
second commitment states, we can regard the joint state as a quantum state close to the
maximally mixed state by the following lemma, which is a quantum version of Lemma 2.5 in
[9].
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Lemma 5.1 Let ρ be a mixed state such that ρ =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx. If there exists a mixed
state σ′ such that δ(ρx, σ′) ≤ ε for all x, then δ(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, where σ =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ σ′.
Proof.
δ(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr
√
(ρ− σ)†(ρ− σ) = 1
2
∑
x
pxtr
√
(ρx − σ′)†(ρx − σ′) ≤ ε
∑
x
px = ε.

Proof. (Theorem ??) We will see the first property. Let p(y) = Pr[fn(Un) = y] and
µ(X) = |X|/2n. For any t ∈ [1, n], let At = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : 2−t ≤ p(y) < 2−t+1}. Since⋃
tAt = fn({0, 1}n), there exists t0 such that Pr[fn(Un) ∈ At0 ] ≥ 1/n. Then, we define Γ1
and Γ2 as follows:
Γ1 = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : p(fn(x)) < 2−t0+1} and
Γ2 = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : p(fn(x)) ≥ 2−t0},
and set Γ = Γ1 ∩ Γ2. Thus, it is easy to see that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 = {0, 1}n and µ(Γ) ≥ 1/n.
Next, we will see the second property. Let C1 and C2 be subsystems for Hcommit1 and
Hcommit2 , respectively. Assume that Alice has two bits w1 (resp., w2) for the first (resp., the
second) half of the commitment. Also assume that x falls into Γ.
Let ρ be the quantum state trC2(ρB). Then, ρ can be written as
ρ =
∑
x∈Γ,h∈H(1)
1
|Γ| · |H(1)| |h, h(fn(x))〉θ(w1)〈h, h(fn(x))|.
Let
ι+ =
∑
z∈{0,1}t−∆1 ,h∈H(1)
1
2t−∆1 |H(1)| |h, z〉+〈h, z| and
ι× =
∑
z∈{0,1}t−∆1 ,h∈H(1)
1
2t−∆1 |H(1)| |h, z〉×〈h, z|.
Then ι
def
= ι+ = ι× is the uniform distribution. By Leftover Hash Lemma, we have δ(ρ, ι) ≤
2−∆1/2.
Next we let ρ′(y) be the quantum state trC1(ρB) when y = fn(x) is given. (Note that any
elements in f−1n (y) are also in Γ. Thus, the likelihood of x is the same as that of any other
x′ ∈ f−1n (y).) Then, ρ′(y) can be written as
ρ′(y) =
∑
x∈f−1n (y),h∈H(2)
1
|f−1n (y)| · |H(2)|
|h, h(x)〉θ(w2)〈h, h(x)|.
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Let
ι′+ =
∑
z∈{0,1}n−t−∆2 ,h∈H(2)
1
2n−t−∆2 |H(2)| |h, z〉+〈h, z| and
ι′× =
∑
z∈{0,1}n−t−∆2 ,h∈H(2)
1
2n−t−∆2 |H(2)| |h, z〉×〈h, z|.
Then ι′ def= ι′+ = ι′× is the uniform distribution. By Leftover Hash Lemma, we have
δ(ρ′(y), ι′) ≤ 2−∆2/2 for any y. By Lemma 5.1 and the triangle inequality, we have
δ(ρB(w1, w2), (ι, ι
′)) ≤ 2−∆1/2 + 2−∆2/2 = 2
8
√
s(n)
=
1
nω(1)
for any w1, w2 ∈ {0, 1}. 
6 Hiding Amplification
In the previous section, we showed that Protocol 1 based on quantum one-way function holds a
“weak” hiding property. In this section, we amplify the “weak” hiding property to a “strong”
one. We consider n2 parallel executions of Protocol 1 to amplify the hiding probability from
1/n to 1 − 2−nΩ(1) . We describe the resulting parallel protocol (called Protocol 2) in Figure
3.
In the rest of this section, we state that Protocol 2 achieves (1 − 2−nΩ(1))-hiding and
preserves the binding property.
Theorem 6.1 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way
function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then, there exists t = t0 ∈ [1, n] such that Protocol 2
satisfies (1− 2−nΩ(1))-hiding if we set ∆1 = ∆2 = 14 log s(n).
Due to the parallel composition, the proof becomes quite simpler than the proof of the
hiding amplification in [13]. The proof of Theorem 6.1 can be done by a standard probabilistic
argument.
Proof. We will see the first property. Recall that Γ = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : 2−t0 ≤ p(fn(x)) <
2−t0+1} for some t0. Let N = n3 and Γ′ = {(x1, . . . , xn2) ∈ ({0, 1}n)n2 : ∃i, xi ∈ Γ}.
We consider the probability p where some xi falls in Γ. Since µ(Γ) ≥ 1/n, we have that
p > 1−(1−1/n)n2 . By the fact that 1− t < e−t, we have p ≥ 1−e−n > 1−2−n = 1−2−N1/3 .
Next, we will see the second property. Let (x1, . . . , xn2) ∈ Γ′. By the definition of Γ′, we
may assume that xJ ∈ Γ for some J ∈ [1, n2]. Recall that Z1(w1) is of the form
|h1,1, h1,1(fn(x1))〉θ(w1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |h1,n2 , h1,n2(fn(xn2))〉θ(w1,n2 )
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Parameters: Integers t ∈ [1, n], ∆1 ∈ [0, t] and ∆2 ∈ [0, n − t].
Commit Phase:
1. Alice with her two bits w1 and w2 first chooses x1, . . . , xn2 ∈ ({0, 1}n)n2 uniformly
and computes y1 = fn(x1), . . . , yn2 = fn(xn2). Also, she uniformly and indepen-
dently chooses pairwise independent hash functions h1,1, . . . , h1,n2 ∈ (H(1))n2 and
h2,1, . . . , h2,n2 ∈ (H(2))n2 .
2. Alice chooses w1,1, . . . , w1,n2 ∈ ({0, 1})n2 and w2,1, . . . , w2,n2 ∈ ({0, 1})n2 such that
w1 = w1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w1,n2 and w2 = w2,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w2,n2 .
3. Next, Alice sends the quantum state
|h1,1, h1,1(y1)〉θ(w1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |h1,n2 , h1,n2(yn2)〉θ(w1,n2 )
⊗|h2,1, h2,1(x1)〉θ(w2,1) ⊗ . . .⊗ |h2,n2 , h2,n2(xn2)〉θ(w2,n2 ) ∈ (Hcommit1)⊗n
2 ⊗ (Hcommit2)⊗n
2
to Bob.
4. Bob then stores the received quantum state ρB until the reveal phase.
Reveal Phase:
1. Alice announces the first decommitments (w1,1, h1,1, y1), . . . , (w1,n2 , h1,n2 , yn2) and the
second decommitments (w2,1, h2,1, x1), . . . , (w2,n2 , h2,n2 , xn2) to Bob.
2. Next, Bob measures the first register of ρB with measurement
{P h,zθ(w1,1)}h∈H(1),z∈range(h1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ {P
h,z
θ(w1,n2 )
}h∈H(1),z∈range(h1,n2 )
and obtains the classical output (h1, z1, . . . , hn2 , zn2), where each (hi, zi) is in H
(1) ×
range(h1,i). Also he simultaneously measures the second register with measurement
{P h′,z′θ(w2,1)}h′∈H(2),z′∈range(h2,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ {P
h′,z′
θ(w2,n2 )
}h′∈H(2),z′∈range(h2,n2 )
and obtains the classical output (h′1, z
′
1, . . . , h
′
n2 , z
′
n2), where each (h
′
i, z
′
i) is in H
(2) ×
range(h2,i).
3. Lastly, Bob accepts the first commitment if and only if hi(yi) = zi for every i, and
recovers the first committed bit w1 as w1 = w1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w1,n2 . Also he accepts the
second commitment if and only if h′i(z
′
i) = xi and yi = fn(xi) for every i, and recovers
the second committed bit w2 as w2 = w2,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w2,n2 .
Figure 3: Protocol 2
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and Z2(w2) is of the form
|h2,1, h2,1(x1)〉θ(w2,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |h2,n2 , h2,n2(x2n)〉θ(w2,n2 ).
Let W (xi, w1,i, w2,i) be the composition of the i-th components of Z1(w1) and Z2(w2), that
is,
W (xi, w1,i, w2,i) = |h1,i, h1,i(fn(xi))〉θ(w1,i)|h2,i, h2,i(xi)〉θ(w2,i).
Since w1,1, . . . , w1,n2 and w2,1, . . . , w2,n2 are randomly chosen so as to satisfy that w1 =
w1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕w1,n2 and w2 = w2,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕w2,n2 , we may assume that w1,j and w2,j with j 6= J
are uniformly and independently chosen from {0, 1} and w1,J and w2,J are determined by w1,
w2, and all w1,j and w2,j such that j 6= J . Thus, we can say that W (xi, w1,i, w2,i) such that
i 6= J does not depend on the value of w1 and w2.
On the other hand, W (xJ , w1,J , w2,J) depends on the value w1 and w2. But, we can show
that it is 1/nω(1)-close to the uniform distribution by using the proof for the 2nd property of
Theorem 5.2. From Lemma 5.1, we can say that (Z1(0), Z2(0)), (Z1(0), Z2(1)), (Z1(1), Z2(0))
and (Z1(1), Z2(1)) are 1/n
ω(1)-close to each other. 
Theorem 6.2 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way
function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then Protocol 2 with setting of parameters ∆1 = ∆2 =
1
4 log s(n), is a 2-parallel quantum bit commitment scheme that is computationally 1-out-of-2
binding regardless of the setting of t.
The above theorem says that Protocol 2 has 1-out-of-2 binding property. Specifically
speaking, the computational binding of the first half commitment can be guaranteed in some
case and the statistical binding of the second half commitment can be guaranteed in the other
case. The computational binding of the first half commitment in Protocol 2 is reduced to the
computational binding of the first half commitment in Protocol 1. The statistical binding of
the second half commitment in Protocol 2 can be shown by a probabilistic argument.
To prove that Protocol 2 is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding, we have to specify a set
that controls the 1-out-of-2 property as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. In the proof of Theorem
5.1, St is such a set. For the proof of Theorem 6.2, we will use S
′
t = {(x1, . . . , xn2) ∈
({0, 1}n)n2 : ∃i, xi ∈ St}. Even if we can use the reduction to the j-th subprotocol, we cannot
know whether xj ∈ St or not. If xj ∈ St, then the reduction goes through. If we cannot
assume that that xj ∈ St, we can say that xj ∈ {0, 1}n. Since we do not have to know some
underlying relation to apply Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem, we can show that
the reduction still goes through.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 5.1. For every t ∈ [1, n], we define
the set of “heavy” strings to be
S′t = {(x1, . . . , xn2) ∈ ({0, 1}n)n
2
: ∃i, xi ∈ St},
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where St is defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
We will show that if (x1, . . . , xn2) ∈ S′t is chosen in the first step of Commit Phase then
the first half is binding and if (x1, . . . , xn2) 6∈ S′t then the second half is binding.
First, we show a reduction from inverting fn to violating the binding property of Protocol 2
in the case of (x1, . . . , xn2) ∈ S′t. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 5.1 f ′n : H(1)×{0, 1}n →
H(1) × {0, 1}t−∆1 is a function that maps (h, x) to (h, h(fn(x))), R′n = {(f ′n(h, x), (h, x)) :
x ∈ St and h ∈ H(1)} and Wh,η = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : (η, (h, x)) ∈ R′n}. We also define Rn =
{(f ′n(h, x), (h, x)) : x ∈ {0, 1}n and h ∈ H(1)}.
Let A3 be a quantum algorithm to violate the binding property of Protocol 2 with proba-
bility ε(n). This means that A3 can send a quantum state in Commit Phase so that Bob can
accept it either as 0-commitment with probability b0(n) and as 1-commitment with prob-
ability b1(n), where b(n) = b0(n) + b1(n) ≥ 1 + ε(n). To make Bob accept the quantum
state as a valid commitment in Protocol 2, A3 has to make Bob accept all executions of
sub-protocol Protocol 1. Let b
(i)
w (n) be the probability that A3 can make Bob accept the i-th
sub-protocol as w-commitment. We set b(i)(n) = b
(i)
0 (n) + b
(i)
1 (n). Let b˜0(n) (resp., b˜1(n)) be
the probability where A3 fails to make Bob accept the quantum state as 0-commitment (resp.,
1-commitment). Similarly, we define b˜
(i)
0 (n) and b˜
(i)
1 (n) for each i ∈ [1, n2]. Then, we have
b˜0(n) + b˜1(n) ≤ 1 − ε. Since the failure probabilities are accumulative, there exists an index
j ∈ [1, n2] such that b˜(j)0 (n) + b˜(j)1 (n) ≤ 1− ε. Hence, we have b(j)0 (n) + b(j)1 (n) ≥ 1 + ε. Thus,
we can assume that a quantum algorithm A4 to violate the binding property of Protocol 1
with probability ε. Note that the violation (by A4) against the binding property of Protocol
1 is respect to either Rn or R
′
n. Fortunately, we do not have to know which relation should
be considered, since the algorithm with respect to Rn is the same as the one with respect to
R′n. If A4 violates the binding property of the j-th sub-protocol and xj ∈ St, A4 does with
respect to R′n. If A4 violates the binding property of the j-th sub-protocol and xj ∈ {0, 1}n,
A4 does with respect to Rn. Here, we consider only the case that A4 does with respect to
R′n, since the other case is similar and easier to show.
From Theorem 4.1, we have another algorithm A5 satisfying that
Pr[A5(H(1,1),H(1,1)(fn(U (1)n )), . . . ,H(1,n2),H(1,n2)(fn(U (n
2)
n ))) = (j, z)
∧ z ∈W
H(1,j),H(1,j)(fn(U
(j)
n ))
] ≥ ε(n)2/4,
whereH(1,1), . . . ,H(1,n
2) are independent and identical distributions toH(1) and U
(1)
n , . . . , U
(n2)
n
are independent and identical distributions to Un.
By the similar discussion in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can say that
Pr[A5(H(1,1),H(1,1)(fn(U (1)n )), . . . ,H(1,j−1),H(1,j−1)(fn(U (j−1)n )),H(1,j), Ut−∆,
H(1,j+1),H(1,j+1)(fn(U
(j+1)
n )), . . . ,H(1,n
2),H(1,n
2)(fn(U
(n2)
n ))) = (j, z)
∧ z ∈WH(1,j),Ut−∆1 ] ≥ ε(n)
4/64.
We consider an algorithm B that on input y = fn(x), picks randomly an integer j′ ∈
[1, n2], a hash function h ∈ H(1). B also picks randomly x1, . . . , xj′−1, xj′+1, . . . , xn2 and
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h1, . . . , hj′−1, hj′+1, . . . , hn2 , computes y1 = fn(x1), . . . , yj′−1 = fn(xj′−1), yj′+1 = fn(xj′+1), . . . , yn2 =
fn(xn2) and outputs the second part of A5(h1, h1(y1), . . . , hj′−1, hj′−1(yj′−1),
h, h(y), hj′+1, hj′+1(yj′+1), . . . , hn2 , hn2(yn2)). Then, we have the following.
Pr[B(fn(Un)) ∈ f−1n (fn(Un))]
≥ Eh←H(1) [Pr[A5(h1, h1(fn(U (1)n )), . . . , hj′−1, hj′−1(fn(U (j
′−1)
n )), h, h(fn(Un)),
hj′+1, hj′+1(fn(U
(j′+1)
n )), . . . , hn2 , hn2(fn(U
(n2)
n ))) = (j, z)
∧j = j′ ∧ z ∈ f−1n (fn(Un))]]
=
1
n2
·Eh←H(1) [Pr[A5(h1, h1(fn(U (1)n )), . . . , hj′−1, hj′−1(fn(U (j
′−1)
n )), h, h(fn(Un)),
hj′+1, hj′+1(fn(U
(j′+1)
n )), . . . , hn2 , hn2(fn(U
(n2)
n ))) = (j, z)
∧z ∈ f−1n (fn(Un))]].
The rest of the probabilistic analysis is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1. This shows that
Pr[B(fn(Un)) ∈ f−1n (fn(Un))] ≥ s(n)−3/4 · ε(n)4/64n2,
which is greater than 1/s(n) if ε is non-negligible.
Next, we consider the case (x1, . . . , xn2) 6∈ S′t. By the definition of S′t, we have xi 6∈ St for
all i. Thus, we can use the discussion for the proof of Theorem 5.1 for each bit w2,i. This
means that the value of b(i)(n) is less than 1 + 1/nω(1) for each bit w2,i. Let us consider
the event that Bob accepts the quantum state sent by Alice in Commit Phase of Protocol
2 as 0-commitment (or, 1-commitment). Let p be the probability that this event occurs.
Since this even occurs if Bob accepts all decommitments of the sub-protocol, we can write
p = p1 · · · · pn2 , where pi is either the probability that Bob accepts the quantum state sent
by Alice in Commit Phase of the i-th sub-protocol as 0-commitment or the probability that
Bob accepts the quantum state sent by Alice in Commit Phase of the i-th sub-protocol as 1-
commitment. Thus, the best strategy for cheating is to behave honestly for n2−1 executions
of the sub-protocol and maliciously for just one execution. Hence, we can upper-bound b(n)
by 1n
2−1(1 + 1/nω(1)) = 1 + 1/nω(1). 
7 Statistically-Hiding Commitment from
(
2
1
)
-Binding Com-
mitment
We have obtained the strongly-hiding 1-out-of-2 binding quantum commitment based on
quantum one-way function. But it is not a single scheme but a family of scheme candidates.
First, we construct a family of candidates for normal statistically-hiding quantum bit com-
mitment from the family of candidates for the strongly-hiding 1-out-of-2 binding quantum
commitment. Next, we construct a single normal statistically-hiding quantum bit commit-
ment from the family of candidates for the statistically-hiding quantum bit commitment.
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7.1 Statistically-Hiding Quantum Commitment Family from
(
2
1
)
-Binding
Quantum Commitment Family
Protocol 2 consists of the first half commitment and the second half commitment. We denote
by P2first(w1) the first half commitment with the committed bit w1 and by P2second(w2)
the second half commitment with the committed bit w2. We consider the protocol (called
Protocol 3) in Figure 4.
Parameters: Integers t ∈ [1, n], ∆1 ∈ [0, t] and ∆2 ∈ [0, n− t]. (These are succeeded to the
sub-protocol P2first and P2second.)
Commit Phase:
1. Alice with her bit w executes P2first(w) and P2second(w) in parallel.
Reveal Phase:
1. Alice sends decommitments for P2first(w) and P2second(w) and Bob recovers the com-
mitted bits w′ and w′′, respectively.
2. Bob verifies the correctness of the decommitments. If the verification procedures for
both P2first(w) and P2second(w) are passed and w′ = w′′ then Bob accepts.
Figure 4: Protocol 3
Theorem 7.1 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way
function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then Protocol 3 with setting of parameters ∆1 = ∆2 =
1
4 log s(n), is a computationally-binding quantum bit commitment scheme regardless of the
setting of t. Also, there exists t = t0 ∈ [1, n] such that Protocol 3 with the same parameter
for ∆1 and ∆2 is statistically-hiding.
The hiding property can be shown by the argument in the proof of Theorem 6.1. Basically,
Protocol 3 has the 1-out-of-2 binding property. Thus, either P2first or P2second must have the
binding property. Even if the adversary can violate either P2first or P2second, such violation
can be detected by the equality check w′ = w′′ in Reveal Phase. Theorem 7.1 can be similarly
shown as Theorems 6.1 and 6.2.
7.2 From a family To single BC
As mentioned in Theorem 7.1, there exists a value t such that Protocol 3 has both the
computational binding and statistical hiding. But, we do not know the right value of t. By
using a similar technique in Section 7, we consider a combined protocol of Protocol with
different parameters.
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P3(t, w) denotes the commit phase of Protocol 3 with the committed value w and param-
eter t. We consider the protocol (called Protocol 4) in Figure 5.
Parameters: Integers ∆1 ∈ [0, t] and ∆2 ∈ [0, n − t]. (These are succeeded to the sub-
protocol P3.)
Commit Phase:
1. Alice with her bit w chooses w1, . . . , wn ∈ ({0, 1})n such that w = w1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wn.
2. Alice executes P3(1, w1), . . . ,P3(n,wn) in parallel.
Reveal Phase:
1. Alice sends decommitment of P3(i, wi) for each i and Bob obtains the committed bits
w′i for all i and computes w
′ = w′1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ w′n.
2. Bob verifies the correctness of the decommitments. If all the verification procedures
are passed then Bob accepts.
Figure 5: Protocol 4
Theorem 7.2 Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}n∈N be an s(n)-secure quantum one-way
function family, where s(n) = nω(1). Then Protocol 4 with setting of parameters ∆1 =
∆2 =
1
4 log s(n), is a computationally-binding and statistically-hiding quantum bit commit-
ment scheme.
Theorem 7.2 can be also shown as Theorems 6.1 and 6.2.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have derived a quantum and non-interactive version (Non-interactive Quantum Hashing
Theorem) of the new interactive hashing theorem. As its application, we have constructed a
statistically-hiding non-interactive quantum bit commitment scheme. We note that by using
the same discussion we can show the parallel composability of our quantum bit commitment
scheme.
In classical cryptography, the interactive hashing theorem has many applications. So,
we hope that Non-interactive Quantum Hashing Theorem also has many applications to
quantum cryptography.
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